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We analyze the rela-
tionship between insur-
ance rate regulation, in-
flationary cost surges,
and incentives for loss
control using state-
level data on workers’
compensation insur-
ance for 24 states dur-
ing 1984–90. Regula-
tors often responded to
rapid loss growth dur-
ing this period by deny-
ing rate increases or ap-
proving increases that
were less than initially
requested by insurers.
We test whether rate
suppression increased
loss growth by dis-
torting incentives for
loss control. Our re-
gressions indicate a
positive and statisti-
cally reliable relation-
ship between loss
growth and lagged mea-
sures of regulatory
price constraints, sug-
gesting that rate regula-
tion increased the fre-
quency and/or severity
of employee injuries.
Scott E. Harrington
University of South Carolina
Patricia M. Danzon
University of Pennsylvania
Rate Regulation, Safety
Incentives, and Loss Growth in
Workers’ Compensation
Insurance*
I. Introduction
Well-designed tort liability and workers’ com-
pensation systems and well-functioning insur-
ance markets encourage efficient safety by inter-
nalizing expected injury costs. Insurance markets
with prices that vary in relation to expected claim
costs allow potential injurers to reduce risk while
still providing incentives for loss control. Be-
cause insurance prices cannot perfectly reflect the
expected cost of risky behavior, however, incen-
tives for loss control are weakened by moral haz-
ard (Shavell 1982). Limited wealth and limited
liability also dilute incentives for loss control.
This problem can be reduced but not eliminated
by compulsory insurance rules (Shavell 1986).
An issue that has received comparatively less
attention is that insurance price regulation also
can distort incentives for safety. Both the adop-
tion and administration of price regulation are in-
fluenced by political pressure. This pressure can
lead to temporary or even chronic differences be-
tween approved rates and the expected costs of
providing coverage for many buyers. Natural in-
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surer supply responses to price constraints can be substantially con-
strained, at least in the short run, by mandates that insurers provide
coverage to all buyers at regulated prices, often on a pooled basis
through residual market mechanisms. Material deviations between reg-
ulated rates and costs are especially likely during periods of rapid loss
growth due to increased consumer pressure for regulatory constraints
(e.g., Baumol 1991), especially when compulsory coverage require-
ments reduce demand elasticity.
If severe regulatory lag in the presence of rapid loss growth drives
a large wedge between prices and expected costs, consequences usually
include a wealth transfer from producers to consumers (e.g., due to
loss of insurer quasi rents; see Harrington [1992]) and some degree of
ex ante cross-subsidy from low-risk buyers to high-risk consumers (see
Kwon and Grace 1996). The efficiency consequences of attendant dis-
tortions in incentives for loss control may be less obvious. But if rate
regulation suppresses rates in relation to expected losses for some con-
sumers, the resulting distortions in incentives can be expected to in-
crease loss growth. The implication is that price regulation that attempts
to shield consumers from the full effects of exogenous cost surges will
increase loss growth and thus ultimately be self-defeating.
This study investigates the relationship between insurance rate regu-
lation, inflationary cost surges, and incentives for loss control using
state-level data on workers’ compensation insurance loss growth for 24
states during 1984–90. Many state workers’ compensation insurance
markets experienced large cost surges during this period (see fig. 1).1
Regulators often responded by denying rate increases or by approving
increases materially lower than initially requested by insurers. The mar-
ket share of the workers’ compensation insurance residual market grew
rapidly in many states.2 We exploit cross-state and time-series variation
in loss growth and regulatory responses to test the prediction that rate
suppression increased loss growth. Our regressions indicate a positive
and statistically reliable relationship between loss growth and lagged
measures of regulatory price constraints, suggesting that rate regulation
led to some increase in the frequency and/or severity of employee inju-
ries.3
Our loss growth models incorporate fixed time and state effects and
condition on several variables that could affect loss growth at the state
level. The use of fixed effects and lagged measures of regulation should
1. For example, benefit costs per $100 of payroll increased from $0.95 in 1978 to $1.56
in 1989, an average annual rate of increase of 4.2% for 1978–84 and 6.2% for 1984–89
(Klein, Nordman, and Fritz 1993, pp. 79 ff ).
2. Workers’ compensation insurance residual markets are briefly described in Section
II below.
3. The finding that rate suppression aggravated loss growth in part may reflect increased
claims reporting or delays in returning to work (e.g., Butler 1994).
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substantially allay concern that the results could reflect correlation be-
tween omitted cost drivers and our measures of regulation. In addition,
the estimated positive relationship between loss growth and regulation
persists when we condition on estimated growth in self-insurance to
control for adverse selection in response to rate suppression.
The possibility that rate regulation may lead to higher loss growth
is discussed by Danzon (1992), Harrington (1992), Kramer (1992), and
Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993). Kaestner and Carroll (1997) provide
evidence of larger (one-digit standard industrial classification) injury
rates in states with some form of statutory rate ‘‘deregulation’’ during
1983–88, arguing that regulation pushes up prices (see Carroll and
Kaestner 1995) and therefore encourages loss control. This explanation
is inconsistent with evidence of rate suppression during the 1980s (e.g.,
see fig. 1). Their estimates instead might reflect lower injury rates at
the time of the statutory change for the few states in their sample that
relaxed rate regulatory statutes (in each case at the beginning of their
sample period), and their injury rate models do not include fixed state
effects.4 Barkume and Ruser (1998) test for a relationship between the
statutory type of rate regulation and levels of workers’ compensation
costs and injury rates over longer time periods, suggesting that statutory
deregulation was associated with a reduction in injury costs and in the
margin between premiums and injury costs. These combined effects are
puzzling and would not be expected in an environment characterized by
strong cost surges and rate suppression. More generally, market-wide
rate suppression cannot be a long-run equilibrium, and the effects of
rate regulation will not be time invariant.
Our analysis focuses on rate regulation’s possible effects on loss
growth during a period characterized by a strong cost surge and atten-
dant failure of regulators to permit premium growth commensurate
with expected loss growth. In contrast to previous studies, we employ
lagged measures of rate suppression that reflect differences among
states regardless of the type of statute: (1) the difference between rates
filed by insurers and approved by regulators and (2) residual market
share (the market share of the assigned risk plan). This approach should
provide a more powerful test of the null hypothesis that rate regulation
did not affect loss growth during a period when most states had some
type of prior-approval rate regulation and few states changed their laws.
Our models include a variety of control variables, including actuarial
predictions of the effects of changes in benefit laws on loss growth.
As noted, fixed time and state effects also are included to help control
for omitted cost drivers.5 Moreover, the analysis of growth rates should
4. Kaestner and Carroll (1997) note that ‘‘including state dummy variables in the model
makes it difficult to identify significant effects’’ (p. 643).
5. Kaestner and Carroll (1997) report a significantly positive relation between injury
rates and contemporaneous residual market share. They suggest that this could indicate
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be much less vulnerable to omitted variable bias than analysis of cost
levels.
Beginning around 1990, numerous states adopted workers’ compen-
sation reform legislation to reduce losses, and many states changed
their systems of voluntary and residual market price regulation. These
changes were associated with slower loss growth, improved insurer
financial results, and declining residual markets and residual-market
deficits. By the mid-1990s, requests for rate increases largely evapo-
rated and rates began to fall in some states. By year-end 1998, the
countrywide residual market share was comparable to the low level of
the early 1980s. Recent data, however, suggest renewed growth in
claim costs and deterioration in insurer underwriting margins. Whether
regulatory responses to a strong cost surge would mimic the 1980s’
experience is an open question.
Our main results imply that insurance rate regulatory systems that
suppress rates in relation to costs have the inefficient and potentially
self-defeating side effect of increasing loss growth. A related implica-
tion is that price regulation can weaken specific insurance pricing
mechanisms, such as experience rating, that align rates with expected
claim costs and thus provide significant incentives for loss control.
These cost-increasing effects of rate regulation raise serious policy con-
cerns, further undermining the weak case for price regulation in com-
petitively structured insurance markets. Our evidence is consistent with
the prediction that deregulation of rates will improve incentives for
efficient loss control.
Section II provides a brief overview of workers’ compensation insur-
ance markets, rate regulation, and related research. Section III develops
our hypotheses concerning the effects of price regulation on loss
growth. Section IV describes the data and methodology, and results
follow in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. Background
The 1980s Cost Surge and Regulatory Responses
Workers’ compensation pays for workers’ medical expenses and wage
loss arising out of work-related injuries and diseases. Employers must
purchase insurance or provide proof of financial responsibility in order
to self-insure. Regulation of workers’ compensation insurance rates in
most states historically required all insurers to use the same rates, rating
reduced safety or that states with more risky jobs could have higher residual market shares.
We use lagged residual market share, and our analysis of growth rates and inclusion of
fixed state effects should largely control for state differences in job risk that are unrelated
to regulation.
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classes, and experience rating plans, with rate filings developed on be-
half of the industry by rate advisory organizations. These organizations
collect loss and expense data from the industry and use these data to
develop ‘‘advisory rates’’ (or, more recently, ‘‘prospective loss costs’’)
for hundreds of rate classes. The National Council on Compensation
Insurance (NCCI) currently serves in this capacity in a majority of
states.
There typically are several hundred rate classes in a state to reflect
differences in industry and type of business. Most states require experi-
ence rating with the exception of small employers. Class rates for an
occupational class are modified upward or downward based on the em-
ployer’s experience in a prior period compared to the class average.
Beginning in the 1970s, some states permitted insurers to file for devia-
tions from rates filed by advisory organizations. In the 1970s and 1980s,
some states began to permit schedule rating (except for small employ-
ers), which allows an insurer to modify the class rate based on the
underwriter’s evaluation of the employer’s risk of loss.
Worker’s compensation insurance residual markets generally require
insurers to provide coverage at a regulated rate to applicants who pre-
sumably cannot obtain voluntary coverage. The usual form of residual
market assigns policyholders to designated servicing carriers, which
issue policies and pay claims in exchange for fees without directly bear-
ing underwriting risk on assigned business. Operating deficits for the
residual market are apportioned among all workers’ compensation in-
surers in proportion to their share of workers’ compensation insurance
voluntary market premiums in the state.
Before the 1980s cost surge, regulated rates generally were set high
enough to encourage insurers to cover most employers voluntarily.
Competitive pressures led insurers to pay dividends to inframarginal
employers; service quality was another dimension of competitive strat-
egy. Insurers also competed with rate deviations and schedule rating
where permitted. The 1980s cost surge produced considerable turmoil.
The increase in workers’ compensation losses relative to payroll is
partly explained by increases in medical care costs in excess of general
wage inflation, benefit growth, and changing workplace demographics
(e.g., Butler 1994). Large differences among states in the level and
growth of losses suggest that other state-specific factors also were im-
portant.
Growth in workers’ compensation insurance losses during the 1980s
was accompanied by deteriorating financial results for insurers, who
argued that many state regulators refused to allow rate increases com-
mensurate with expected loss growth. Consistent with binding regula-
tory constraints on rate increases in the presence of rising costs, the
countrywide size of the workers’ compensation insurance residual mar-
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ket increased sharply, with the residual market share of premiums
growing to over 50% in a number of states (see fig. 1).6
Growth in residual markets and expected operating deficits on resid-
ual market business increased voluntary market rate levels needed by
insurers to cover expected costs for the overall workers’ compensation
insurance market in a given state. In the long run, expected residual
market deficits require a cross subsidy from the voluntary to the resid-
ual market to prevent widespread exit, and linkage between deficits and
voluntary market supply makes chronic cross subsidies feasible. In the
short run, regulatory constraints on voluntary market rates may par-
tially shift the incidence of residual market subsidies to insurer capital.
Exit will be slow, and insurers are therefore vulnerable to expropria-
tion, because exit requires insurers to write off much of their investment
in a given state (Harrington 1992). Higher voluntary market rates to
finance residual market deficits encourage more low-risk businesses to
self-insure, further reducing the size of the voluntary market. Escalating
growth in the residual market and inability to shift residual market
deficits to a shrinking voluntary market in the 1980s caused a virtual
collapse of the workers’ compensation insurance market in a few states
(e.g., Maine and later Rhode Island).
Related Work
As we explained in the introduction, Kaestner and Carroll (1997) and
Barkume and Ruser (1998) provide mixed evidence of whether the stat-
utory form of regulation is related to levels of workers’ compensation
injuries and costs. Several studies examine the relationship between
the type of workers’ compensation insurance regulation (prior ap-
proval, loss-cost systems, competitive rating) and premium levels and
premium-cost margins to test hypotheses of industry versus consumer
capture of the regulatory process (e.g., Appel, McMurray, and Mulva-
ney 1992; Klein et al. 1993; Carroll and Kaestner 1995; Schmidle
1995). Conclusions about the effects of rate regulation differ, presum-
ably in part because of heterogeneity in the types of regulation and
because the effects of a particular type of regulation differ depending
on its implementation and the cost environment during the sample pe-
riod.
6. Reduction in regulated rate levels relative to the average cost of providing coverage
for a class during the 1980s also led to lower dividend payments and fewer downward
deviations and schedule rating credits. Concern with affordability of coverage to employers
also played a role in the decision by some states to shift to prospective loss cost systems,
in which the NCCI files prospective loss costs only on behalf of insurers, with individual
insurers filing their own profit and expense factors. Loss cost systems often were advocated
by regulators and other parties as a means of increasing competition, or at least fostering
the impression of increased competition by reducing reliance on advisory organization
expense and profit loadings in filed rates.
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These studies generally use a broad definition of competitive rating
that encompasses states that have adopted loss-cost systems (see n. 6)
or allow insurers to deviate from rates filed by rate advisory organiza-
tions, even though loss costs or individual insurer rates remain subject
to prior regulatory approval.7 By the early 1990s, however, few states
had true competitive rating systems that expressly relied on competition
to control rates and permitted insurers to alter rates without close regu-
latory scrutiny. Furthermore, even if voluntary market rates are not
regulated, regulation of residual market rates can suppress rates for
many employers.
Several studies provide evidence that higher workers’ compensation
benefits increase the ratio of loss costs to payroll, particularly in firms
subject to little or no experience rating of premiums (e.g., Ruser 1985,
1993; Chelius and Kavanaugh 1988; Fortin 1992; and Meyer, Viscusi,
and Durbin 1995). The results of several studies suggest that workers’
compensation insurance experience rating increases employer incen-
tives to control costs (Ruser 1985; Bruce and Atkins 1993; and Hyatt
and Kralj 1995). An implication of this is that suppression of rate levels
to which experience rating is applied will reduce incentives for safety
(see below).
Butler (1994) argues that workers’ compensation loss growth largely
reflects statutory benefit increases, declines in waiting periods, and
changes in workforce demography. He provides evidence that cost
growth in part reflects higher propensity to report claims rather than a
change in workers’ or firms’ risk-taking behavior (also see Krueger
1990; and Butler and Worrall 1991). We noted earlier that increased
claims reporting might explain part of any increase in loss growth due
to rate suppression.
Carroll (1994) analyzes price regulation’s effects on the estimated
proportion of total workers’ compensation paid losses that is self-
insured across states during 1980–87. The study provides some
evidence that higher ratios of premiums to losses increase the self-
insurance proportion, implying that suppression of the statewide
premium-loss margin might discourage self-insurance.8 Butler and
Worrall (1993) analyze the proportion of paid losses represented by
self-insurance for selected years during the period 1954–82 as a func-
tion of the size distribution of firms. They provide evidence that the
probability of self-insuring is a convex function of firm size. They do
not explore possible effects of price regulation.
7. Barkume and Ruser (1998) distinguish states that retained some type of prior approval
from those that did not.
8. No relationship is found between residual market share and the self-insurance vari-
able.
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III. Hypotheses
Rate suppression may inflate loss growth through several channels that
are not mutually exclusive. Workers’ compensation involves multiparty
accidents subject to strict statutory liability for employers. Optimal loss
control requires care by employers, employees, and insurers. Insurance
that is accurately experience rated does not distort incentives for opti-
mal investment in injury prevention (Shavell 1982). By preventing in-
surers from charging rates that reflect expected loss costs plus a com-
petitive expense and profit margin, rate suppression is expected to dull
loss control incentives for all three parties.
Subsidies to High-Risk Behavior
Regulation may constrain the incentive effects of experience rating in
two main ways. First, it could limit percentage-experience-modification
factors applied to class rates. Second, it could reduce the class rates to
which the factors are applied, thus producing a smaller absolute debit
for relatively poor experience or absolute credit for good experience.
Because experience-rating systems generally have been uniform across
the states for which the NCCI serves as a rating advisory organization
and changed little until the 1990s, this second effect may be more likely
than the first.
Regulatory constraints on experience-rating debits and credits reduce
employer incentives to invest in loss control and to require such invest-
ments by employees. The firm bears the costs of loss control by em-
ployers and employees, but benefits are diffused across other insured
firms unless premiums are experience rated to reflect the change in
expected losses. Postinjury moral hazard—overuse of medical care,
delay in return to work—also will likely increase in response to rate
suppression, leading to increased duration and cost per claim.
In addition to effects related to experience rating, the tendency of
rate suppression to lower rates for the highest risks in each class and
increase rates or lower dividends for better risks also acts as a subsidy
to high-risk activity. The prevalence of relatively high-risk firms within
a state will tend to increase over time, and incentives for safety, condi-
tional on the type of activity, are undermined. While incentives for
safety might possibly increase for lower-risk firms that end up financing
part or all of the subsidy to high-risk firms, the net effect is plausibly
to reduce safety on average.
Possible Effects on Insurer Behavior
In some cases, regulation might allow a large part of increases in ex-
pected losses to pass through but constrain the markup for insurer ex-
penses and return on equity to a level that is inadequate to cover optimal
insurer investment in loss control. If so, insurers might reduce expendi-
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tures on loss control, even if higher losses result, because part of the
increase in expected losses is passed through whereas the loss-control
expense comes entirely out of profit.9 Whether rate regulation in prac-
tice places greater constraints on expense and profit loadings than on
allowances for expected losses is uncertain. In the 1980s, many regula-
tors failed to approve requests for rate increases based on projected
trends in losses as well as requests for expense and profit loadings. To
the extent that rate regulation is neutral in disallowing either expenses
or loss costs, the distorting effects of rate suppression on insurer invest-
ments in loss control are reduced. Even in this case, however, some
increase in losses due to reduced investments in loss control by insurers
might arise because part of any increase in losses will be shared with
employers through the operation of experience rating.10
Testable Implications and the Effects of Self-Insurance
The preceding discussion implies that rate suppression will increase
loss growth by distorting the incentives of employers, employees, and
insurers. We test this key prediction using data on insured loss growth
at the state aggregate level and two measures of rate suppression, con-
trolling for exogenous factors that could influence loss growth. Given
available data and measures of rate suppression, it is not feasible for
us to distinguish the possible effects of subsidies on employer, em-
ployee, and insurer behavior. The preceding discussion emphasizes rate
regulation’s possible effects on loss growth due to distorting effects on
employers, employees, and insurers. Growth in insured losses may also
be affected if regulation alters the proportion and mix of firms that self-
9. The incidence of any suboptimal investments in loss control by insurers is probably
divided between employers and employees. Both theory and evidence indicate that the
costs of workers’ compensation premiums are borne by employees in the long run (see,
e.g., Viscusi and Moore 1987; Gruber and Krueger 1990). Reductions in insurer loss control
efforts that lead to higher costs per claim, and higher total premiums may be passed on
to employer policyholders in the form of lower dividend payments and/or higher renewal
premiums, including lower experience-rating credits.
10. As noted earlier, most residual markets are administered by assigning employers
to a number of servicing carriers that receive a fixed proportion of premiums to service
the policy (determine the premium, issue the policy, provide loss control advice, settle
claims, etc.). Residual market deficits are then allocated to insurers in the state in proportion
to their premium volume in the voluntary market. With this structure, the costs of most
forms of loss control are fully internalized to the servicing carrier, but it ultimately bears
only part of any resulting reduction in claim costs. A possible result is that incentives for
investment in loss control (and perhaps premium collection) will be suboptimal in the
residual market unless counteracted by other factors. The disincentive to invest in loss
control compared to voluntary market coverage will be mitigated if not eliminated by a
number of influences, including: (1) the extent to which it is costly for servicing carriers
to distinguish residual market employers and treat them differently from voluntary market
employers, (2) the magnitude of the voluntary market share of servicing carriers and thus
their participation in deficits, and (3) the degree of regulatory monitoring and monitoring
by other insurers through the NCCI and other means.
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insure as opposed to buying commercial insurance. Suppression of the
average margin between rates and costs might be expected to reduce
self-insurance (e.g., Carroll 1994), at least in the short run before the
possible cost-increasing effects of rate suppression reduce the attrac-
tiveness of commercial insurance despite the suppression of rates com-
pared to costs. Any short-run reduction in self-insurance would tend
to increase growth in insured losses relative to payroll if higher-risk
employers are most likely to buy commercial insurance in response to
rate constraints.
But in the long run, rate suppression is both likely to increase the
percent of total payroll that is self-insured and increase the average
risk level in the commercially insured sector. Regulation-induced cross
subsidies from low- to high-risk firms encourage more low-risk firms
to self-insure, while subsidies to high-risk firms reduce their incentive
to self-insure. The resulting self-selection will increase the ratio of in-
sured losses to insured payroll. There was substantial concern during
the late 1980s and into the 1990s that growth in self-insurance was
reducing the voluntary market premium base for assessing residual
market deficits.
One method of controlling for loss growth due to changes in self-
insurance would be to analyze data for a common sample of insured
employers over time. Because we were unable to obtain such data, we
use the indirect approach of controlling for growth in the estimated
proportion of payroll that is self-insured.
IV. Methodology and Data
Empirical Framework
We assume that log growth in the expected loss per $100 of payroll,
E(Gjt), depends on fixed time and state effects, regulation, and exoge-
nous time and state varying factors:
E(Gjt) ; ln1E(Ljt)/PjtLjt21/Pjt212 5 a j 1 a t 1 b ¢ Xjt 1 g ¢ Rjt 1 ujt, (1)
where for state j and year t, Ljt is insured losses, Pjt is insured payroll,
a j represents a fixed state effect, a t represents a fixed time effect, Xjt
is a vector of exogenous factors that influence expected loss growth,
Rjt is a vector of variables measuring price regulation, b and g are pa-
rameter vectors, and ujt is a disturbance term that reflects idiosyncratic
variation in expected loss growth.
Realized loss growth can be expressed as Gjt ; (1 1 e jt) E(Gjt),
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where e jt is the percentage forecast error. Because ln(1 1 e jt) < e jt for
relatively small e jt, realized cost growth can be expressed as:
Gjt < a j 1 a t 1 b ¢ Xjt 1 g ¢ Rjt 1 ujt 1 e jt. (2)
This equation is the basis for our empirical tests of the null hypothesis
that realized loss growth is unrelated to our measures of rate suppres-
sion (i.e., g 5 0), versus the alternative hypothesis that rate suppression
increases loss growth.
Data and Sample
We obtained by-state data from the NCCI for a variety of characteristics
of the workers’ compensation market, including residual market premi-
ums and share of total premiums; filed and approved rate changes for
the voluntary and residual markets; insured payroll, indemnity, and
medical incurred losses (on a policy-year basis); average weekly
wages; and the predicted growth in loss costs due solely to changes in
benefit provisions.11 The loss data are NCCI projections of ultimate
costs using first report data and first-to-ultimate report loss develop-
ment factors based on historical experience. The last available year for
the payroll and loss data was 1990. The first year of filed and approved
rate data was 1983. Because we use one-year lags of many of the vari-
ables in the regression models (see below), we analyze loss growth for
policy periods from 1984 through 1990. This period encompasses the
1980s cost surge and precedes the subsequent enactment in many states
of significant benefit reforms and changes in residual market pricing
programs.
The NCCI sources did not include data for states with monopoly
state insurers and a number of states with independent rating organiza-
tions and/or residual market pools. Many of the states for which some
data were reported had missing loss and/or payroll data for one or more
years. We excluded states with 3 or more years of missing data or 2
consecutive years of missing data. We also exclude states with sizable
state insurers that compete with private insurers. These criteria pro-
duced a sample of 24 jurisdictions (23 states and the District of Colum-
bia, hereafter ‘‘24 states’’) with reasonably complete data for residual
market share, filed versus approved rates, payroll, and incurred losses.
Reasonably complete data were not available for several of the largest
states (e.g., California, Texas, New York, Michigan, and Pennsyl-
vania).12
11. Residual market premiums and market shares were obtained from annual issues of
the NCCI’s Management Summary. Average weekly wages and predicted loss growth due
to benefit changes were obtained from the NCCI’s Annual Statistical Bulletin. The re-
maining data were contained in unpublished exhibits purchased from the NCCI.
12. The 24-state sample includes: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Washing-
ton, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
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Measures of Loss Growth and Regulation
Loss growth. We used the loss and insured payroll data to calculate
the average insured loss per $100 of insured payroll each year for total
losses (indemnity plus medical).13 For states with missing data for 1
or 2 (nonconsecutive) policy years, we used the geometric growth in
losses and payroll to interpolate missing values.14 We measure loss
growth as the log growth rate in loss per $100 of payroll, that is, the
natural logarithm of the variable in year t to its value in year t 2 1.
The log transformation produces a continuously compounded annual
growth rate and reduces skewness in the growth rates due to random
loss variation.
Regulation. According to our main hypothesis, loss growth should
be positively related to (current and prior) rate suppression. One ap-
proach to testing this hypothesis would be to use indicator variables
for different types of rating laws. However, as we explained earlier,
there is considerable heterogeneity in rating laws and their implementa-
tion, and very few states had true competitive rating systems for the
voluntary market during our sample period. Moreover, material sup-
pression of residual market rates can occur even if voluntary market
rates are nominally unregulated, with regulated residual market rates
acting as de facto constraints on voluntary market rates.15
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The sample excludes Maine,
a state that is well known for the collapse of its voluntary market in the mid-1980s. The
primary data sources included data for Wisconsin except for residual market share. We
obtained residual market share data from the Wisconsin residual market and included this
state. Maine had extreme values for many of the variables that were available, and it enacted
substantial and hotly contested benefit reforms and fundamentally altered the operation of
its residual and voluntary markets with its Fresh Start legislation in the middle of the
sample period. This program allowed assessments for residual market deficits against em-
ployers and contingent assessments on insurers depending on ‘‘good faith’’ efforts to de-
populate the residual market. We experimented with including Maine in the sample using
available data. The explanatory power of the regressions declined substantially, and the
coefficients declined and standard errors increased for most of the explanatory variables,
including the regulation variables.
13. Separate analysis of indemnity loss growth produced similar implications. The signs
of the coefficients were similar for medical loss growth, but the equations had considerably
less explanatory power.
14. The policy years are not strictly contemporaneous, as they begin in different months
for different states; however, virtually all of the policy years began in the first 6 months
of the calender year. For 1983, some of the policy periods differed from 12 months for
some states. The payroll data for these cases were annualized for the purpose of calculating
the self-insured payroll measures discussed later.
15. Based on information reported by Klein (1992) and in the NCCI’s Annual Statistical
Bulletin as well as information provided to us by the American Insurance Association,
only three states in our sample (Illinois, Kentucky, and Vermont) and during our sample
period had rating laws that explicitly relied on competition to control voluntary market
rates without regulatory prior approval. The small number of states with true competitive
rating in the voluntary market precludes meaningful segmentation of the sample and esti-
mation of models separately for these and the remaining states. It also precludes a before-
and-after analysis of the effects of deregulation. Consistent with rate suppression despite
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Rather than rely on categorical measures of type of regulation, we
employ two continuous measures of the stringency of rate regulation
(see the appendix for details): (1) one plus the filed rate increase divided
by one plus the approved rate increase and (2) residual market share of
premiums (at voluntary-market-rate level). We include one-year lagged
values of each of these variables in our loss-growth model. We do not
estimate an explicit lag structure given limited time series observations
and correlations in the variables over time and between the variables.
However, each measure (and especially residual market share) reflects
the cumulative effects of rate suppression over a period of years.
The filed rate versus approved rate variable measures the extent to
which regulators failed to approve rates requested by the industry dur-
ing a period of rapid loss growth. Residual market share reflects the
overall effects of price regulation on the willingness of insurers to pro-
vide coverage voluntarily. In principle, the relationship between these
measures of rate suppression has implications for the allocation of the
cost between insurers and policyholders in the voluntary market. When
the filed-rate versus approved-rate variable is held fixed, increases in
residual market share should be associated with greater cross-subsidies
among policyholders. Conversely, when the residual market share is
held fixed, an increase in the filed-rate versus approved-rate variable
should be associated with voluntary market insureds bearing less of
the expected residual market deficit in the form of higher rates and
thus with lower insurer profits (and perhaps lower expenditures on loss
control). However, the high correlation between these two measures
impedes disentangling these effects.
Control Variables
Total losses divided by payroll in $100s in year t 2 1 is included in
the loss-growth model to allow for diminishing growth as loss levels
increase, which could arise from possible effects of higher loss levels
on incentives for loss control and from any tendency toward mean re-
version in loss levels over time.16 The models also include contempora-
neous and lagged 1- and 2-year estimated growth in losses due to bene-
fit law changes using data reported in the NCCI’s Annual Statistical
Bulletin.17 Contemporaneous changes in benefit provisions obviously
should directly affect loss growth. Lagged values of the NCCI esti-
‘‘competitive rating’’ for the voluntary market, two of these states (Kentucky and Vermont)
had large residual markets and deficits during our sample period.
16. Similar results were obtained using the lagged value of premiums per $100 of pay-
roll.
17. According to the NCCI, the ‘‘theoretical monetary costs are determined in accor-
dance with standard procedures for estimating the effect of changes in benefit provisions
. . . as adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’’ (NCCI 1993,
p. 62).
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mated effects on losses are included to control for noncontemporaneous
influences, such as delayed responses in firm behavior or in incentives
to file claims. 18 In addition to the direct effects, changes in benefits
also could be indirectly related to loss growth. In particular, benefit
changes will likely be correlated with the regulatory and loss-growth
environment across states, with states with high losses and loss growth
ultimately more likely to reduce benefits (or likely to increase benefits
more slowly) than states without substantial cost pressure. If so, any
positive correlation between loss growth and benefit increases that
otherwise would occur will be reduced.
We include contemporaneous growth in the average weekly wage
to allow for a possible nonproportional relationship between loss
growth and payroll growth. Such a relationship might arise, for exam-
ple, from a possible relation between wage growth and economic
growth. We do not make a strong prediction concerning this variable’s
sign. We also include the lagged ratio of medical losses to total losses,
again without making any prediction concerning the sign on this vari-
able, although rapid inflation in medical costs during the sample period
might imply a positive relation to loss growth.
We also analyze models that include an estimate of the growth in
the proportion of payroll that is self-insured to control for the self-
selection that could affect insured loss growth if rate suppression
induces relatively low-risk employers to self-insure. As discussed in
Section III, if restrictive regulation causes relatively more low-risk em-
ployers to self-insure than high-risk employers, the resultant increase
in average expected loss as a proportion of payroll for insured employ-
ers will increase insured losses relative to payroll. Given available data,
we cannot employ rigorous methods for controlling for sample selectiv-
ity. Assuming that any selection effect is associated with self-insurance
growth, we can test for whether regulation affects loss growth after
controlling for estimated growth in self-insurance, which we define as
the log growth rate of the ratio of estimated uninsured payroll to total
payroll in a state (see appendix). We can also provide evidence of
whether regulation is related to our measure of log growth in self-
insurance.
We include fixed year and state effects in the model to allow for the
effects of omitted influences that could give rise to state-invariant ef-
fects or, more important, time-invariant differences in mean loss-
growth rates across states that are not captured by our other variables.
Our analysis of loss-growth rates rather than loss levels and the inclu-
sion of state effects should substantially reduce concern with bias from
18. See Butler (1994) for a brief review of the literature. Several studies have obtained
estimated elasticities of claim frequency with respect to benefit levels greater than one.
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possible omitted factors that cause differences in loss growth across
states.
Estimation
We estimate the models using least squares with White’s heteroscedas-
ticity consistent standard errors to construct quasi t-values. We also use
maximum likelihood estimation assuming normally distributed distur-
bances and multiplicative heteroscedasticity (Harvey 1976). Specifi-
cally, the log of disturbance variance is assumed to be a linear function
of insured payroll (i.e., d 0 1 d 1 Payroll). Compared to simply weighting
the data by the inverse of payroll, this procedure does not assume a
strictly proportional relationship between payroll and disturbance vari-
ance. This is desirable because the disturbance in equation (2) reflects
both random fluctuations in realized loss growth (e jt), with variance
inversely related to the magnitude of insured payroll via the law of
large numbers, and model error (ujt), with variance that need not be
related to payroll.19 The maximum likelihood estimator is more efficient
than least squares under the assumed error structure.
V. Empirical Results
Sample means, standard deviations, and selected percentile values for
the variables used in the analysis are shown in table 1. The variables
each exhibit substantial variation within the panel. Table 2 shows bivar-
iate correlation coefficients between the variables. The results indicate
relatively high absolute correlations among the regulatory variables,
relatively high correlations between the regulatory variables and loss
per $100 of payroll, and small positive correlations between the regula-
tion variables and loss growth.20
Estimates of Loss Growth Equations
Tables 3 and 4 show least squares and maximum likelihood results for
the loss-growth equations. Least squares estimates with heteroscedas-
ticity-consistent t-values are shown in table 3; maximum likelihood
estimates are shown in table 4. Equations (1), (2), and (3) in each table
19. In particular, weighting by inverse payroll assumes a constant, negative unitary
elasticity of disturbance variance with respect to payroll. Our multiplicative model allows
the elasticity to increase as payroll increases (i.e., to become smaller in absolute value).
Compared to the alternative approach of assuming that disturbance variance is a linear,
rather than exponential, function of payroll, the multiplicative specification avoids the po-
tential problem of negative variance estimates for some observations. Qualitatively similar
results to those reported were obtained weighting by the inverse of payroll.
20. The relatively high positive correlation between growth in self-insured share of pay-
roll and growth in average weekly wage could reflect the use of wage growth in the estima-
tion of growth in self-insured share of payroll (see appendix).
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exclude the estimated growth in self-insured share of payroll, whereas
equations (4), (5), and (6) include this variable.
The overall results provide compelling support for rejecting the null
hypothesis of no relation between the measures of rate suppression and
loss growth. In the equations that include a single measure of rate sup-
pression, either the (lagged) filed-rate versus approved-rate variable or
(lagged) residual market share is always positively and significantly
related to loss growth (t-value exceeds two). The least-squares results
suggest a more reliable relation between loss growth and the filed ver-
sus approved variable than between loss growth and residual market
share. However, the maximum likelihood (quasi) t-values for the coef-
ficient on residual market share also exceed two in equations (2) and
(5), which omit the filed versus approved variable. Not surprisingly
given the correlation between the regulatory measures, the t-values de-
cline when both regulatory variables are included. However, an F-test
for the least squares estimates and a likelihood ratio test for maximum
likelihood estimates reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on
both regulatory variables are jointly zero at the .03 significance level
or lower in all cases. The maximum likelihood results provide strong
evidence that disturbance variance is inversely related to payroll.
The positive relation between loss growth and the rate suppression
measures is robust to including the self-insured growth variable. The
coefficients on self-insured share growth are positive and significant
for each specification and estimation method. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that adverse selection reflected in self-insured share
growth increased insured loss growth.21 The coefficient estimates for
residual market share (but not those for the filed versus approved vari-
able) decline when the self-insured growth variable is included, as
would be expected if some of the growth in loss costs reflects a selec-
tion effect. Consistent with regulatory-induced adverse selection, re-
gressions (not shown) of the estimated growth in the self-insured share
of payroll on the regulatory variables and a vector of controls, including
fixed period and state effects, indicate a significantly positive relation
between self-insured share growth and the regulation variables. Thus,
our overall analysis of these data suggest that rate suppression in-
creased loss growth both by inducing adverse selection and distorting
incentives for loss control.
The point estimates for the regulatory variables indicate economi-
cally meaningful effects on loss growth. For example, the maximum
21. We obtained similar results when we estimated the model using instrumental vari-
ables to allow for the possibility that loss growth and growth in self-insured share of payroll
are jointly determined. We used variables indicating whether group self-insurance was
permitted and the lagged estimated share of payroll represented by self-insurance as identi-
fying exogenous variables.
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likelihood estimate of the coefficient on the filed versus approved vari-
able from equation (4) in table 4 implies a 1.8% increase in loss growth
for a 10% increase in the lagged ratio of the filed rate versus approved
rate. Similarly, equation (5) in table 4 implies a 3.7% increase in loss
growth for a 10% increase in lagged residual market share.
The estimated coefficients for the control variables generally have
the expected signs and are often statistically significant. The coefficient
for lagged losses divided by payroll is negative and highly significant
in each equation, consistent with some mean reversion in loss growth.
As expected, the estimates for contemporaneous benefit growth are
positive and significant, with higher values and some evidence of
lagged responses to benefit growth for the least squares estimates but
not the maximum-likelihood estimates.22 The lagged ratio of medical
losses to total losses is not significant. The coefficients for growth in
average weekly wage are negative, with absolute t-values greater than
two when the self-insurance growth variable is included. Not surpris-
ingly, the results (not shown) also indicate significant state and time
effects.
Robustness
Two additional procedures were used to analyze the robustness of our
main findings to possible influential observations. First, we obtained
similar results using a rough ‘‘trimming’’ procedure in which the 10%
of the observations with the highest squared residuals based on the full
sample least squares estimates were excluded from the sample.23 Sec-
ond, we examined the sensitivity of the results to omitting different
states. The estimates obtained from single-state deletion were robust,
with the exception of two small states. Excluding Rhode Island, a state
with well-known cost problems and accompanying rate suppression,
produced positive but insignificant coefficient estimates for the regula-
tory variables. Conversely, excluding South Dakota produced a mate-
rial increase in the coefficient estimates and t-values for the regulatory
variables. Exclusion of both Rhode Island and South Dakota produced
results with the same implications as those reported in tables 3 and 4.
VI. Conclusions
The results of our analysis of state aggregate loss growth in workers’
compensation insurance are consistent with the hypothesis that rate
22. A contemporaneous and lagged response of loss growth to benefit growth with total
elasticity greater than one would not be unexpected given other evidence of a positive
effect of benefit growth on claim filings and duration (e.g., Ruser 1985; and Meyer, Viscusi,
and Durbin 1995; also see Butler and Worrall 1991).
23. See Knez and Ready (1998) for a related approach and discussion in a different
context.
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suppression increased loss growth during the sample period by dis-
torting incentives for loss control. We find evidence of a positive and
significant relationship between loss growth and the lagged values of
two measures of rate suppression (filed rate increase versus approved
rate increase and residual market share). This positive relationship per-
sists when growth in the estimated proportion of payroll that is self-
insured is included in the models to control for the selection effect
that arises if rate suppression increases the proportion of lower-risk
employers that self-insure. Our results imply that binding constraints on
price increases in the presence of rapid loss growth led to both adverse
selection and increases in insured loss growth apart from any selection
effect.
These results clearly are relevant to current debate and proposals for
deregulating property-liability insurance rates in states that retain such
regulation. Several states recently have deregulated rates for large,
commercial insurance buyers while retaining rate regulation for work-
ers’ compensation and personal lines. Our results imply that deregulat-
ing voluntary market insurance rates and avoiding material subsidies
to the residual market would temper future loss growth by improving
incentives for loss control.
Appendix
Measures of Regulation and Self-Insurance Growth
Filed rate versus approved rate. After making several adjustments to the data
described below, we calculated separate ratios of one plus the requested (filed)
rate increase to one plus the approved rate increase for increases that occurred
in a given year for the voluntary and residual markets. (If the state had uniform
rates for the voluntary and residual markets the same ratio was used for each
market.) We then calculated a weighted average of the voluntary and residual-
market ratios using residual and voluntary market shares in the prior year as
weights. For example, if the filed rate increase was 20% for the voluntary market
and 30% for the residual market, if an increase of 10% was approved for both
markets, and if the residual market share in the prior year was 25%, the calculated
filed rate versus approved rate would equal 1.11 (0.75 3 1.2 / 1.1 1 0.25 3
1.3 / 1.1). We did not attempt to include separate filed rate versus approved
variables for the residual and voluntary markets in the models given correlations
between the variables. It also would be necessary to weight each variable by its
respective market share, further increasing the bivariate correlation between the
variables and making it unlikely that we could reliably estimate separate coeffi-
cients. Klein et al. (1993) used a filed versus approved rate variable in their analy-
sis of the effects of regulation on loss ratios.
All of the filing information was carefully reviewed and adjustments made to
the reported filed increases to reflect factors mentioned in footnotes to the data
that would reduce comparability between the original filings and approved filings.
One adjustment involved reducing voluntary market filings to reflect the approval
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of an ‘‘offset factor’’ for the voluntary market if the approved residual market
filing included approval of a new pricing program that would reduce the necessary
rate increase for the voluntary market. This adjustment was made because original
voluntary market filings probably were gross of this amount in many cases. This
adjustment had relatively little effect on the calculated ratios. Some states had
multiple filings in a year. Subsequent filings usually were made to reflect the
effects of changes in benefits rules and usually were approved as filed. In a few
cases, the second filing clearly was an attempt to significantly increase rates fol-
lowing an earlier filing that was approved for less than the filed amount. In these
instances we calculate the filed request for the year as the product of the earlier
approved amount and the subsequent filed request. We did not adjust for within-
year variation in timing of the earlier approval and subsequent request.
The most important adjustment involved the treatment of years in which no
filing for an increase was made. In some states with restrictive regulation, a filing
for a rate increase may not be made in a given year because of the knowledge
that no agreement will be reached with regulators. Using a value of one for the
filed rate versus approved rate would clearly be inappropriate in these cases. To
reduce this potential bias, we used the ratio of the filed-to-approved rate change
for the previous filing if this ratio was greater than or equal to 1.05 and if the
ratio for the first subsequent filing was greater than or equal to 1.15. This proce-
dure assumes that the difference between filed and approved rate increases in the
prior year persists until another filing is approved.
While the filed rate versus approved rate variable should be highly correlated
with rate suppression, it is an imperfect quantitative measure of the degree to
which market prices are suppressed by rate regulation for at least two additional
reasons. First, conventional actuarial procedures may allow the NCCI some flex-
ibility in determining the filed rate increase. The possibility exists that the NCCI
might submit higher requests, other things being equal, in states with more severe
rate suppression, hoping to achieve whatever rate increase is possible. Second,
the use of schedule rating, dividends, and other competitive pricing programs
will be less prevalent when regulation suppresses class-rates gross of such adjust-
ments. In both cases, however, the resulting error in the lagged filed rate versus
approved rate variable as a measure of regulatory suppression of average market
rates should be positively correlated with the true but unobservable value.24 As
a result, the filed rate versus approved rate variable should still increase with the
degree of rate suppression, which makes it a useful albeit imperfect proxy.
Residual market share. The residual market share of statewide direct premi-
24. To see this, define rate suppression as the average net rate (gross rate less price
adjustments such as schedule rating and dividends) that would arise under competition
less the average net rate under regulation. The average filed rate can be viewed as the
average net rate under competition plus the expected average competitive price adjustment
plus any strategic bias. The average approved rate is the average net rate under regulation
plus the expected average price adjustment under regulation. The average filed rate less
the average approved rate therefore equals the difference in net rates under competition
versus regulation plus the expected difference in the average price adjustment plus any
strategic bias. The expected difference in the average price adjustment under competition
versus regulation and any bias should both be positively related to the amount of rate
suppression (the difference in average net rates).
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ums is highly correlated with the extent of any cross-subsidies from the voluntary
to the residual market due to price regulation. It is also affected by the extent of
any overall rate suppression (both current and in prior years). In addition, the
residual market share of premiums reflects differences in the average rate level
between the voluntary and residual markets. Other factors held constant, states
with a greater rate differential between the residual and voluntary markets will
have larger residual market shares of premiums just due to the rate level effect.
To control for this in the regression analysis and to better approximate the residual
market share of payroll (for which we did not have state aggregate data), we
estimated the residual market share of premiums at voluntary market rate level
using the voluntary and residual market rate differential. Specifically, the residual
market share at voluntary rate level is calculated with residual market premiums
deflated by the one plus the proportionate rate differential between the voluntary
and residual market. The rate differential was calculated using the history of filed
and approved rate increases for the voluntary and residual markets. The residual
market share at voluntary rate level is highly correlated with the unadjusted share
(correlation 5 0.98) during our sample period because voluntary and residual
market rate differentials generally were of modest size. Preliminary analysis indi-
cated that results of estimating our loss growth models did not differ materially
for the two measures.
Self-insurance. Accurate measures of the proportion of total payroll or in-
sured losses represented by self-insurance are not available. Previous analyses of
factors that influence levels of self-insurance by Butler and Worrall (1993) and
Carroll (1994) used estimates of the proportion of total paid losses that represents
losses paid by self-insurers. The estimates of losses paid by self-insurers and state
data on losses paid by commercial insurers and state funds used in these studies
are published annually in the Social Security Bulletin in articles written by Wil-
liam Nelson (e.g., Nelson 1993) and earlier by Daniel Price. We collected these
data for our sample period and 1991–93 (given that changes in paid losses will
lag changes in incurred losses and payroll). Prior to 1992, many of the estimates
for losses paid by self-insurers had few significant digits and changed little over
time. Later reports note that improvements in data collection were made in 1992.
As a result, the estimates of losses paid by self-insurers increased sharply for
many states and decreased sharply for a few others. These large changes when
better data were obtained led us to conclude that the paid loss estimates in the
late 1980s were unreliable.
As an alternative to using the estimates of losses paid by self-insurers, we
employ estimates of the proportion of total payroll in a state represented by em-
ployers that self-insure (or who are not subject to workers’ compensation stat-
utes). We obtained data on total nonfarm employment by state and multiplied
the employment figures by the statewide average annual wage (52 3 average
weekly wage) to get estimates of total nonfarm payroll. We then estimated the
proportion of payroll that is self-insured (or not insured) as (nonfarm payroll 2
insured payroll) / (nonfarm payroll) and calculated (log) growth rates for this
ratio. Note that these growth rates also include changes in payroll that are not
insured due to, for example, employers not being subject to workers’ compensa-
tion law. An equivalent procedure (with signs reversed) would have been to con-
duct the analysis with estimated growth in insured payroll.
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